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NOTES 
KEEPING UP WITH OFFICER JONES:  A 
COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT AND GPS SURVEILLANCE 
Kaitlyn A. Kerrane* 
 
 
Each day, individuals use technological devices to make their lives 
easier.  One such device is the Global Positioning System (GPS), which has 
increasingly gained popularity in recent years.  Police use of GPS in 
robbery, drug, murder and other investigations has also increased.  Several 
high profile cases have brought the law enforcement uses of GPS into the 
public eye and elicited a public response.  Warrantless installation and 
monitoring of these devices for up to months at a time have been challenged 
as unreasonable Fourth Amendment searches.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided on the constitutional issues 
raised by police GPS monitoring.  Recent cases such as United States v. 
Maynard and United States v. Pineda-Moreno illustrate the lack of 
consistency in the federal courts’ approach in addressing the Fourth 
Amendment implications raised by these devices.  This Note examines the 
Fourth Amendment issues surrounding both the installation and monitoring 
of GPS units.  It examines the disagreement among the courts in dealing 
with the warrantless installation of the GPS device, as well as the federal 
circuit split regarding monitoring. 
This Note asserts that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in both 
the installation and monitoring of a GPS unit in light of several 
considerations:  property interests, public exposure, the nature of the police 
intrusion, and the type and quantity of information obtained.  The 
differences between the former and current technology also point to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Ultimately, this Note advocates a 
warrant requirement for both the installation and monitoring of GPS 
devices to uphold the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  A clear 
warrant requirement developed by the Supreme Court or Congress would 
protect individual rights while providing appropriate guidance to law 
enforcement officers moving forward.  
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Boston University.  
I would like to thank my Note adviser Professor Daniel Capra.  I would also like to thank 
Brian Kessler, Rebecca Kagan Sternhell, Mandy Barner, and my family for their 
encouragement, support, and edits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Washington, D.C.:  Law enforcement officers attached a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) device to Antoine Jones’ Jeep without a warrant 
or his consent,1 monitoring his movements twenty-four hours a day for one 
month.2
Portland, Oregon:  Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents installed 
GPS surveillance devices onto Juan Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep on at least seven 
occasions.
 
3  Once, they attached a device at his place of work.4  At least 
three times, the agents installed the device at the curb of Pineda-Moreno’s 
home.5  Twice, they entered his driveway to attach the device.6  Over four 
months, law enforcement officers recorded and tracked Pineda-Moreno’s 
movements.7
Lebanon, Pennsylvania:  DEA agents installed a GPS device onto 
Edward Jesus-Nunez’s Mercedes without a warrant.
 
8  One month later, 
agents attached an additional GPS device onto another of Jesus-Nunez’s 
vehicles.9  Police monitored the devices for over ten months without any 
warrants.10
Santa Clara, California:  College student Yasir Afifi found a GPS device 
attached to his vehicle.
 
11  His acquaintance posted its likeness on the 
internet to determine the device’s purpose.12  The FBI then arrived at his 
apartment complex, retrieved its device, and indicated that Yasir was under 
surveillance.13
 
 1. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566–67 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 
766 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010). 
 
 2. Id. at 558. 
 3. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 617 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 20, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
 4. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pineda-Moreno, No. 10-7515 (Nov. 20, 
2010). 
 5. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 4, at 3. 
 6. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 4, at 3. 
 7. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213. 
 8. United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at *1–2 
(M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010). 
 9. Id. at *1. 
 10. Id. at *1–2.  
 11. Kim Zetter, FBI Allegedly Caught Using GPS To Spy on Student, CNN.COM (Oct. 
08, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-08/tech/fbi.tracks.student.wired_1_device-gps-
fbi?_s=PM:TECH.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
2011] FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GPS SURVEILLANCE 1699 
Latham, New York:  State police agents climbed underneath Scott 
Weaver’s van in the early morning to attach a GPS device.14  This device 
could identify both the speed of the van and its location to within thirty 
feet.15  Police monitored his movements continuously for sixty-five days.16
 
 
Across the country, police utilize GPS surveillance as an investigative 
tool.17  Many police departments will not comment on the extent of the use 
of this technology, but the evidence indicates an increase in general law 
enforcement use.18  Often law enforcement officials lack a valid warrant to 
install or monitor the device.19
The Federal Circuits and state courts of last resort have split on whether 
law enforcement use of GPS surveillance constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.
 
20  The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided the 
validity of warrantless installation or monitoring of a GPS unit under the 
Fourth Amendment, but it has been asked to consider the issue.21
This Note discusses both the constitutionality of the installation and 
monitoring of a GPS device to fully illustrate the potential Fourth 
Amendment implications of GPS surveillance.  Courts have typically only 
focused on monitoring, but both aspects implicate the Fourth Amendment.  
Though installation and monitoring are closely linked, and obviously rely 
on one another for functionality, this Note addresses them separately for 
clarity since the analyses have slightly different considerations.  This Note 
provides a comprehensive overview of the constitutional issues and current 
debate. 
 
Part I discusses the current GPS technology and how law enforcement 
uses the devices.  The discussion also includes an overview of the Fourth 
Amendment and the reasonable expectation of privacy.  Part I continues by 
 
 14. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1195–96. 
 17. See generally Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon:  GPS Device, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (discussing use generally, and 
specifically by Virginia police departments); Brian Smith, Without Warrants, Police Use 
Trackers To Follow Suspects, RICH. REG., Sept. 27, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://richmondregister.com/homepage/x546339112/Without-warrants-police-use-trackers-
to-follow-suspects (reporting on an investigation into GPS use in Richmond, Virginia); 
Morning Edition:  GPS Devices Do the Work of Law Enforcement Agents, (National Public 
Radio broadcast Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=130851849 [hereinafter GPS Devices] (interview of Carol Johnson by 
Steven Inskeep regarding the general increase in use of GPS devices by law enforcement 
agencies). 
 18. Hubbard, supra note 17 (stating that the police have various surveillance techniques 
they do not want to disclose to the public); Smith, supra note 17 (reporting the Richmond 
Police Chief refused to comment on investigative techniques including GPS). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 WL 4595522, at *2 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 10, 2010). 
 20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 8–13 (summarizing the federal 
and state level splits). 
 21. See id. at 1.  
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analyzing how the Supreme Court has treated the constitutionality of both 
the installation and monitoring of older types of tracking devices in the past 
to provide a framework for the modern debate. 
Part II explores the current federal circuit split as to whether the 
installation and monitoring of GPS devices constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.  It also identifies select legislative responses to GPS 
installation and monitoring.  Part III asserts that an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her vehicle and its movements, which 
is violated by GPS installation and monitoring.  Ultimately, this Note 
advocates a warrant requirement for installing and utilizing GPS devices for 
police tracking purposes. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING GPS TECHNOLOGY AND HOW THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IS APPLIED 
The jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment must constantly evolve to 
adapt to changing societal expectations and technological capabilities.  This 
section discusses current GPS devices, past tracking technology, and the 
Fourth Amendment.  Part I.A presents information on the current state of 
GPS technology.  Part I.B provides a historical background of the Fourth 
Amendment and its basic requirements.  Part I.C discusses the mechanics of 
a Fourth Amendment analysis and outlines the considerations used in its 
application.  Part I.D analyzes how the Supreme Court has dealt with the 
installation and monitoring of tracking devices in the past. 
A.  GPS:  Understanding the Technology and Its Current Use 
An understanding of the workings and capabilities of GPS technology 
shows how its use by law enforcement officers could potentially violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  This section explains the basics of GPS technology, 
discusses how police utilize the technology, and identifies the differences 
between GPS technology and past law enforcement tracking devices. 
1.  GPS:  How It Works and What It Can Do 
All GPS devices work in essentially the same manner.  GPS satellites 
transmit information to GPS receiver devices on the ground.22  The receiver 
then estimates its distance from a particular satellite to determine its general 
surface location.23  By connecting with four satellites, the receiver can 
determine its latitude, longitude, and elevation.24
 
 22. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 308–
09 (2004). 
  GPS accuracy depends on 
the type of receiver, but the government reports that typical precision is 
 23. How Does GPS Work?, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, 
http://www.nasm.si.edu/gps/work.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 24. Do You Know Where You Are?—The Global Positioning System, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. NAT’L OCEAN SERV. EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2008), 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/geodesy/geo09_gps.html.  
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within eight meters.25  In addition, by taking varied readings, GPS trackers 
can provide information about the speed and direction of the targeted 
vehicle, as well as the time spent at a location.26
GPS functions in all weather systems.
 
27  The current technology works 
equally well indoors and out.28  GPS technology gets more advanced every 
year and will undoubtedly continue to do so.29
Originally designed by the military in the 1970s, GPS use has steadily 
increased.
 
30  Private use GPS units became increasingly common 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s as the government upgraded and increased 
the number of satellites.31  Private use continues to increase and the 
Department of Defense plans to launch an additional block of satellites in 
2011 to accommodate more users.32
2.  Law Enforcement Uses for GPS Technology 
 
The GPS system satisfies many law enforcement needs.  The police can 
easily obtain, attach, and monitor the units.33  The new technology costs 
significantly less than the human monitoring necessary to physically track a 
suspect.34
 
 25. Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L COORDINATION OFF. FOR SPACE-BASED 
POSITIONING, NAVIGATION & TIMING, http://www.gps.gov/support/faq/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010) (reporting “accuracy of 7.8 meters” with “95% confidence”); see also Hubbard, supra 
note 17 (describing the abilities of typical law enforcement GPS systems).  Some types of 
devices have even better accuracy. See Glancy, supra note 22, at 309 (noting that differential 
GPS has accuracy of up to one meter); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts?  GPS 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 420 (2007) (noting the 
European Galileo GPS satellite system can achieve one meter accuracy).  
  The devices can record extensive information that police can 
 26. See John S. Ganz, Comment, It’s Already Public:  Why Federal Officers Should Not 
Need Warrants To Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1325, 
1328–29 (2005) (reporting typical accuracy within two miles per hour); Hubbard, supra note 
17 (discussing the use of the speed element to arrest a slow moving individual in residential 
neighborhoods where abductions were occurring). 
 27. See Hutchins, supra note 25, at 418 (stating that precipitation, fog, and sand do not 
affect the GPS). 
 28. See id. at 420. 
 29. See Susan J. Walsh & Ivan J. Dominguez, Privacy and Technology:  Law 
Enforcement’s Secret Use of GPS Devices, CHAMPION MAG., May 2009, at 29, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/0/6666338cb48c6cf9852575e600629c0c?OpenDocument 
(noting that today’s technology has improved from only a few years ago and is always 
increasing in capability while simultaneously decreasing in cost). 
 30. The GPS Revolution—GPS:  A New Constellation, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE 
MUSEUM, http://www.nasm.si.edu/gps/revolution.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). 
 31. Id.; see also Hutchins, supra note 25, at 414 (noting a 2005 increase to twenty-nine 
satellites); Hubbard, supra note 17 (describing an increase in use and decrease in cost since 
civilian use began in 1996). 
 32. See Jim Garamore, Lynn Discusses Budget Priorities for Space, U.S. DEPT. OF 
DEFENSE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=58751. 
 33. Ganz, supra note 26, at 1329 (discussing low costs and small size); see also 
Hutchins, supra note 25, at 419 (describing a GPS device that “measures just 2.56 inches by 
1.7 inches by 1.1 inches and weighs just over three ounces”); Smith, supra note 17 
(describing the local drug task force’s GPS units as “small, lightweight, ruggedized, reliable, 
easy-to-use and easy-to-install” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 34. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:  
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
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only otherwise obtain by constant physical surveillance, an unlikely reality 
for law enforcement.35  The recordings provide more accurate and 
undistorted information to the police.36  In addition, remote GPS tracking 
removes the safety risk to police officers who physically track suspects.37  
Law enforcement has access to progressively more advanced GPS 
surveillance devices to track subjects, which compounds these benefits.38
Police departments can use GPS units in a variety of law enforcement 
contexts.
 
39  Police used the technology in the high profile Scott Peterson 
murder trial to show visits by the defendant to the crime scene.40  A 
Virginia police department utilized the technology to track a man suspected 
of abducting and sexually assaulting women.41  Police often use the 
technology in drug investigations, robbery investigations, and probation 
contexts to monitor the movements of the suspects.42  The GPS also has 
implications for catching terrorist suspects.43
3.  Beepers v. GPS:  Similarities and Differences 
 
Law enforcement agents have used tracking devices for decades.  In the 
1970s and 1980s, police used radio transmitter (beeper)44 technology.45
 
1349, 1374–75 (2004) (discussing how new technology decreases time and monetary costs); 
Ganz, supra note 26, at 1357 (comparing the few hundred dollar costs of GPS technology 
with the $1920 cost of a typical physical tail of the suspect). 
  
 35. See Glancy, supra note 22, at 300 (discussing how high manpower costs and the 
reactions of individuals being physically watched severely limit long-term physical 
tracking); Recent Case, United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 2230, 2233–34 (2007) (noting that constant physical surveillance was cost prohibitive 
and GPS allows for “cost efficient fishing expeditions”); GPS Devices, supra note 17 
(describing GPS as a “failsafe” way to track).  
 36. Ganz, supra note 26, at 1355–56 (discussing the higher accuracy of technological 
evidence). 
 37. Id. at 1356. 
 38. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983) (primitive beeper 
technology), with People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009) (Q-ball GPS 
device—a GPS device that is battery operated), and Hutchins, supra note 25, at 418–19 
(describing GPS “darts” that police can shoot at passing cars to provide instantaneous 
tracking).  Generally, the use of all types of GPS devices have been increasing. See Smith, 
supra note 17 (reporting that local budgets and expenditure reports reflect the purchase of 
additional GPS units); GPS Devices, supra note 17 (discussing the Department of Justice’s 
increasing use of GPS). 
 39. See Ganz, supra note 26, at 1330–32; Hubbard, supra note 17 (stating that Virginia 
police used GPS in robbery, narcotics, and homicide investigations). 
 40. Ganz, supra note 26, at 1329–30; see also Hutchins, supra note 25, at 447–48 
(describing use of GPS to find a victim’s body by tracking the suspect to the site). 
 41. Hubbard, supra note 17. 
 42. Ganz, supra note 26, at 1330–32; see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
1212, 1213 (9th Cir.) (drug trafficking), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 
994 (7th Cir. 2007) (drug manufacturing); United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 
2010 WL 4595522, at *7 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) (bank robbery). 
 43. See Zetter, supra note 11 (discussing an FBI ongoing investigation of an American 
citizen with known ties to Egypt). 
 44. This Note will use the term “beeper” to discuss any tracking device that is not a GPS 
unit. 
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While some analogize this more primitive location tracking technology to 
GPS tracking, the technologies do not function identically.46
The technologies have similarities.  Beepers and GPS devices serve 
essentially the same purpose:  determining location.
 
47  In order to do so, 
police must physically attach both types of tracking devices to the object.48  
Neither device transmits pictures or visual recordings of locations.49
Despite these similarities, beepers and GPS devices vary in terms of the 
amount and sophistication of information obtained by the device.
 
50  
Beepers employed in the past emitted periodic radio signals that could be 
detected by radio receivers.51  Beepers do not use satellite technology, but 
could convey location by way of these electronic pulses.52  Police needed to 
be in a relatively close distance in order to obtain these readings.53  By 
contrast, GPS devices do not require constant monitoring or close proximity 
to obtain information.54  GPS devices can also convey information about 
latitude, longitude, elevation, speed, and direction.55
The two technologies also differ significantly in regard to the retention of 
the tracking information.  Beepers function passively and do not store any 
data,
 
56 whereas GPS devices record location and movement information,57 
allowing law enforcement officials to review and utilize that recorded 
information remotely or at a later time.58  Some devices do not even require 
removing the device to retrieve the information.59
B.  Understanding the Fourth Amendment:  History and Current Analysis 
 
The preceding overview of GPS technology clearly indicates the 
potential of the technology not only to increase the efficacy of law 
 
 45. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 277 (1983).  
 46. Tarik N. Jallad, Recent Development, Old Answers to New Questions:  GPS 
Surveillance and the Unwarranted Need for Warrants, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 354 
(2010). 
 47. Id. at 356–57. 
 48. Id. at 357.  There are other forms of technology to determine location that do not 
have to be attached. See Glancy, supra note 22, at 306, 309–13 (discussing toll tag 
transponders, telematic technology and wireless devices). 
 49. Jallad, supra note 46, at 357. 
 50. Id.; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g denied, 
625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).  
 51. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 n.1 (1984) (citing United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983)); Ganz, supra note 26, at 1328 (explaining the beeper’s value lies 
in the police’s ability to track it); Jallad, supra note 46, at 354–55. 
 52. See Ganz, supra note 26, at 1328. 
 53. See Jallad, supra note 46, at 358. 
 54. See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant:  Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Raised By Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2010) (discussing the remote tracking capabilities of the GPS). 
 55. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 56. Ganz, supra note 26, at 1328. 
 57. Id. at 1328–29. 
 58. Koppel, supra note 54, at 1065. 
 59. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009) (noting the Q-ball device 
used permits “drive-by” downloading). 
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enforcement departments, but also to violate individual privacy rights.60
Part I.B.1 provides a historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  
Part I.B.2 explains the basic analysis courts use to decide whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to a particular situation. 
  
The question of whether the Constitution protects individuals from this type 
of government surveillance arises under the Fourth Amendment.  This 
section explains the purpose of the amendment and its modern application 
in order to elucidate the current debate regarding constitutionality of the 
installation and monitoring of a GPS unit. 
1.  The Fourth Amendment:  Protection from Unreasonable Search and 
Seizure 
The historical background of the Fourth Amendment provides insight 
into how the modern analysis works.  Under British rule, soldiers 
commonly issued general warrants allowing arrests without wrongdoing, 
searches without particularity, and seizures at whim.61  The Founders 
sought protection from these types of unreasonable governmental intrusions 
when creating the Bill of Rights.62  The drafters wrote the Fourth 
Amendment to “end the abuse[s] of general exploratory searches” and 
“empower the federal courts to enforce the Fourth Amendment as a legal 
guarantee.”63
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.
  The text of the Fourth Amendment encompasses protections 
against searches, seizures, and arrests: 
64
The Fourth Amendment fails to explicitly define when a court must require 




 60. See generally Blitz, supra note 34 (discussing privacy concerns raised by various 
new technology); Glancy, supra note 22 (discussing privacy issues on the open road); Kate 
Bolduan, Is GPS a High-Tech Crime-Fighting Tool or Big Brother?, CNN.COM (Aug. 18, 
2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-18/justice/gps.tracking_1_gps-receiver-crimes-and-
track-gps-evidence?_s=PM:CRIME (discussing both security and privacy concerns).  
  Scholars have 
 61. See PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW:  A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 21–22 (2005) (noting that British writs of assistance allowed for 
broad searches of “houses, vessels, warehouses, shops, and all other places for uncustomed 
goods” for the lifetime of the current sovereign plus six months); see also THOMAS N. 
MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 17–18 (2009) (describing the general 
warrants and writs of assistance used in the colonies). 
 62. See HUBBART, supra note 61, at 60–67 (discussing the ratification debates and 
amendments regarding unreasonable search and seizure in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
New York, and North Carolina); MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 19 (discussing ratifying 
conventions that proposed amendments to bar unreasonable searches). 
 63. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 75–82. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 65. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT:  A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS 42 (1966) (identifying possible 
interpretations).  The Supreme Court itself has recognized that its interpretation varies. See 
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extensively debated the phraseology and relationship between the clauses.66  
Regardless of the original intent of the words chosen, the Supreme Court 
has professed “a strong preference for warrants” because they serve as a 
“more reliable safeguard against improper searches.”67  Thus, the Court 
typically requires a warrant prior to a search and seizure.68  In order to 
obtain a warrant, police need to show probable cause that the location to be 
searched will lead to evidence of a crime.69
2.  Meeting the Qualifications for Fourth Amendment Protection 
 
The text and background of the Fourth Amendment suggests a preference 
for warrants prior to a search.70  However, this preference only applies 
when the activity in question qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search.71  A 
search occurs when an act infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy 
that “society is prepared to consider reasonable.”72  The infringement 
analysis has two prongs.73  First, a governmental actor must carry out the 
activity alleged to violate the Fourth Amendment.74
 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[O]ur 
jurisprudence [has] lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant 
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”). 
  Second, the 
complaining party must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
 66. Little legislative history exists regarding the language of the Fourth Amendment and 
its ratification, making a definitive original understanding next to impossible. See THOMAS 
K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 40–42 (2008); 
HUBBART, supra note 61, at 86 (“[Terms] have no obvious self-executing meaning and often 
excite considerable debate in given cases.”); LANDYNSKI, supra note 65, at 42 (“The search 
and seizure provision . . . ha[s] both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.”).  It is 
beyond the scope of this Note to determine the “correct” interpretation of the original 
language.  Instead, this Note will simply apply the presumptions utilized by the Supreme 
Court in its analyses. 
 67. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that a search of a protected area or interest 
is “presumptively unreasonable” without a search warrant); see also HUBBART, supra note 
61, at 161–67 (discussing the development and application of the search warrant requirement 
rule in a number of different Fourth Amendment contexts). 
 68. There are a few long-standing criminal exceptions to this warrant requirement. See 
generally HUBBART, supra note 61, at 249–80 (discussing the rationales and applications of 
the search incident to lawful arrest, stop and frisk, automobile, consent, and exigent 
circumstances exceptions). 
 69. CLANCY, supra note 66, at 476 (defining probable cause); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009) (defining probable cause as “[a] reasonable ground to 
suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific 
items connected with a crime). 
 70. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 71. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (determining that 
inspection of garbage is not a search and thus no warrant required); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276 (1983) (finding that no warrant is required for a tracking device because the 
monitoring was not a search); see also HUBBART, supra note 61, at 129 (discussing how 
these questions arise only in instances of first impression). 
 72. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also infra Part I.C. 
 73. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 131. 
 74. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding the Fourth 
Amendment’s restraints are on government agencies only). 
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location or activity being searched.75  If the activity meets both of these 
prongs, then a search has occurred, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
applies, and courts require a warrant.76  If the activity does not meet both 
prongs, then the amendment’s protections do not apply and police do not 
require a warrant.77
The Court has traditionally considered law enforcement officials to be 
governmental actors under the first prong of the “search” analysis.
 
78  
Accordingly, much of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on 
whether the police activity represents an invasion of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.79  The analysis of the reasonable expectation prong 
has not been straightforward or predictable.80
The Fourth Amendment has a procedural component as well.  A 
defendant must have standing in order to challenge the activity.
  It includes many potential 
considerations that will be discussed extensively in Part I.C.3. 
81  Mere 
presence in a location such as a house or car does not automatically convey 
standing.82  Instead, an individual has to show that her individual rights 
were violated because the police searched her property.83  A person cannot 
challenge evidence found against her if the search violated a third party’s 
rights or occurred with third-party consent.84
Fourth Amendment protections can have high stakes for the government 
and an individual accused of a crime.  Where a court finds that the police 
obtained evidence by unconstitutional means, it generally excludes the 
  The courts address the 
standing issue as separate from the question of whether a search has 
occurred, but it can function to severely limit which law enforcement 
activities are challenged. 
 
 75. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 131. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See CLANCY, supra note 66, at 7–8. 
 78. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983) (applying Fourth Amendment 
protections to acts by Minnesota law enforcement); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 
(1979) (applying Fourth Amendment protections to acts by Baltimore city police); HUBBART, 
supra note 61, at 117 (“The Fourth Amendment applies to all state, federal and local law 
enforcement officials in the United States and its territories.”). 
 79. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 132–33 (noting that intent, physical location, ability of 
others to similarly intrude, and general societal expectations are some of the considerations 
important in the analysis). 
 80. The Supreme Court has often disagreed on how to implement this test in various 
factual circumstances. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (5–4 decision); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (same); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986) (same); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (same). 
 81. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (overturning the former “target” 
theory of standing); see also CLANCY, supra note 66, at 96–98 (discussing the procedure and 
ramifications of the current standing doctrine). 
 82. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132–34. 
 83. See id. at 134; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (holding 
that an individual could not challenge the search of another’s purse even if it held the 
individual’s contraband); HUBBART, supra note 61, at 112 (explaining that the individual 
making the claim must show that the activity violated her interests and not those of a third 
party). 
 84. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 112. 
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evidence to deter future police misconduct.85  This “exclusionary rule” has 
a few exceptions, but functions to keep illegitimately obtained evidence out 
of criminal proceedings.86
C.  The Supreme Court and the Difficulty In Defining “Reasonable 
Expectations” 
 
A violation of the Fourth Amendment has the potential to exclude 
evidence, which could jeopardize the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Thus,  
courts carefully apply its protections.  The constitutionality of a search 
under the Fourth Amendment relies on the definition of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.87
Part I.C.1 explores the modern reasonable expectation of privacy test.  
Parts I.C.2 and I.C.3 discuss property interests and other common 
considerations utilized to determine reasonable expectations of privacy in 
modern cases.  These considerations include property interests, public 
exposure, the nature of the law enforcement intrusion, the kind of 
information obtained, and the quantity of information obtained. 
  To determine whether a defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, courts employ a complicated analysis 
with many considerations and few bright-line rules. 
1.  The Katz Test:  Development and Current Application 
Prior to 1967, the “reasonable expectation” analysis focused on whether 
police invaded a private location—essentially equating the Fourth 
Amendment analysis to the law of trespass.88  The Warren Court, in Katz v. 
United States,89 shifted Fourth Amendment analysis from the protection of 
only individual places to protection against intrusions on the individual’s 
privacy—even in public90—by holding that, “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”91
 
 85. See CLANCY, supra note 66, at 610–11.  The Court often engages in a cost-benefit 
analysis that balances the loss of pertinent evidence with the likelihood of future deterrence. 
See id. at 611. 
 
 86. Id. at 610.  There is some debate over the continued applicability of the exclusionary 
rule and whether it serves a constitutional function. See id. at 612 (citing Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)). 
 87. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 88. See MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 223–24 (discussing the shift of focus in the Katz 
decision); Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 17–20 (2006) (comparing the Olmstead “literal view” and 
the intangible interests protected by Katz).  Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 466 (1928) (utilizing physical invasion to determine existence of Fourth Amendment 
searches), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) (purporting to shift the 
focus).  
 89. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 90. Id. at 350 (protecting Katz’s privacy from electronic listening in a public telephone 
booth). 
 91. Id. at 351.  Legal scholars debate whether this shift was ever actually realized. See 
CLANCY, supra note 66, at 69 (comparing the liberal Court’s intentions with the conservative 
Court’s later restrictions of the Fourth Amendment); MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 225–26 
(discussing whether Katz has lived up to its potential); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and 
Technology:  Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. 
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To determine what qualifies as a “reasonable expectation of privacy” the 
Court asks two questions:  (1) whether there is a subjective expectation of 
the individual that her action will be private and (2) whether such 
expectation is one “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”92  
The Court has recently focused more on the objective expectations.93  The 
Court still considers the subjective aspect in decisions, but has made it clear 
that personal desires for privacy do not automatically trigger a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.94  Therefore, much of the Court’s determination of 
individual privacy rights falls under the “objective reasonableness” prong of 
the standard.95
2.  The Fourth Amendment Still Protects Property Interests 
 
Katz focuses Fourth Amendment protection on individual privacy rights, 
but that does not mean that the Fourth Amendment no longer protects 
property interests.96  In fact, property interests still play a significant role in 
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence97
 
L.J. 51, 81–83 (2002) (describing canine sniff and aerial surveillance cases to emphasize the 
physical intrusion analysis and the “impotence” of Katz). 
 since they serve as a 
 92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  The Court utilizes the concurring 
opinion’s language because Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion failed to define the 
term “privacy” and proved difficult to apply. See CLANCY, supra note 66, at 59 n.68 
(discussing the extensive use of the term “privacy” with little clarification on what was 
protected).  This Note will not discuss various conceptualizations of privacy.  For an in-
depth discussion of privacy, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1087 (2002).  
 93. There are a number of possible reasons for the subjective prong’s subordination. See 
HUBBART, supra note 61, at 134–35 (rationalizing the emphasis because constitutional rights 
are not defined by subjective intent); Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search:  
Intrusiveness and The Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2010) (“[T]he 
diminished focus on subjective expectations is driven by the practical reality that individuals 
rarely engage in criminal conduct without taking at least nominal efforts to avoid 
detection.”). 
 94. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 428. 
 95. Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1191–92. 
 96. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
503, 516 (2007) (“[P]rotection for property under the Fourth Amendment remains a major 
theme of the post-Katz era . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)).  In addition, the Fourth 
Amendment also protects personal property by prohibiting unreasonable seizures.  Seizures 
do not normally implicate privacy concerns, but rather deprive the individual of dominion 
over her property. See HUBBART, supra note 61, at 216 & n.143.  This Note will not address 
Fourth Amendment seizures, since GPS does not typically interfere with the possession or 
use of the object. See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (requiring “meaningful 
interference” with possessory interests to constitute a seizure). 
 97. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97 (1990) (extending the reasonable 
expectation of privacy to overnight guests in the home because they had been given a 
property interest in the home); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (holding 
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal, private “containers”).  
Professor Orin S. Kerr argues that even Katz could be read as employing property-based 
interests in applying Fourth Amendment protections. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 823 (2004) (calling the installation of the electronic bug on the property 
used by Katz an invasion of Katz’s temporary property interest in the telephone booth). 
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clear indicator of a reasonable expectation of privacy.98  An individual also 
typically has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her personal property, 
such as bags or boxes.99  Generally, where an individual has a legitimate 
property interest in a location or item, unauthorized access to that property 
violates the reasonable expectation of privacy one has in her property.100  
That individual loses her property rights, including the right to exclude 
others, when the property is invaded.101  Ultimately the connection to the 
personal property must be substantial enough to indicate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.102
The Supreme Court has held that individual privacy rights extend to 
certain places, including dwellings and automobiles.  First, an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her home and its curtilage, 
defined as the “area immediately surrounding” the dwelling.
 
103  Second, the 
owner, or an individual with a significant connection to an automobile, 
typically has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, though it may be a 
lesser expectation of privacy than in a home.104  The Court has 
unanimously agreed that stopping vehicles on a public road qualifies as a 
seizure.105  In 2009, the Supreme Court reiterated the legitimate objective 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle.106  Some argue that individuals’ 
personal activities in their cars also engender a subjective expectation of 
privacy as well.107
3.  Other Considerations in the Reasonable Expectations Analysis 
 
The Court conducts a more complicated analysis in situations where the 
individual’s property interest is unclear or insubstantial.  The Court utilizes 
 
 98. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 430 (noting that a subjective expectation of privacy can 
be supported as reasonable by property law concepts). 
 99. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 149–50. 
 100. Kerr, supra note 96, at 516 (discussing the property interest consideration as an 
example of the “positive law model” of Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 101. CLANCY, supra note 66, at 77–83 (discussing the right to exclude). 
 102. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 150–51.  There is some indication that when the 
government engages in even a minor physical intrusion of a protected area or property to 
obtain information, the intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961)). For a discussion of the factors contributing to 
substantiality, see infra Part I.C.3. 
 103. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1987) (extending protection to the 
curtilage and stating that the proximity from the home, uses of the land, and steps taken to 
protect the area from others determines the curtilage); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
178 (1984) (highlighting the sanctity of the home under the Fourth Amendment); HUBBART, 
supra note 61, at 139–46 (discussing open fields and curtilage analysis as well as the Fourth 
Amendment protections extended to these areas).  
 104. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979)). 
 105. Glancy, supra note 22, at 298 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004)). 
 106. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (recognizing a lesser, but 
“nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection,” reasonable expectation 
of privacy in vehicles). 
 107. Glancy, supra note 22, at 295 n.3. 
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various considerations to determine reasonableness in these situations.108  
Generally, the considerations do not function independently and often 
overlap in practice.109
a.  Public Exposure:  Can It Be Seen In Public? 
  The Supreme Court’s analysis of reasonable 
expectation of privacy considerations illustrates how it might decide in the 
future.  This section explores four commonly used considerations:  public 
exposure, nature of the government intrusion, type of information obtained, 
and quantity of information obtained. 
The public exposure consideration looks at both the voluntary nature of 
the exposure and whether a private actor would have access to the 
information in question.  Typically, when an individual voluntarily exposes 
information to the public, this effectively undermines any potential 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.110  A basic 
correlation has developed in the jurisprudence:  the higher the public 
accessibility of the information or area, the less likely the privacy of the 
item or act will be protected.111
The Court has utilized this consideration in a number of factual 
circumstances.  For example, individuals have no legitimate reasonable 
expectation of privacy in land that “usually [is] accessible to the public and 
the police.”
 
112  The Court has held that open areas of land, even if privately 
owned, are not subject to the warrant requirement because the land is 
effectively exposed to the public.113  The Court has found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in locations that can be openly viewed by the public, 
even if only by aerial visual surveillance.114
 
 108. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (identifying original intent, 
societal understanding, and location as considerations in determining whether a location 
requires constitutional protection); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 59 (2007) 
(identifying a series of past considerations). 
  The Fourth Amendment does 
 109. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–15 (1986) (looking at public exposure 
and nature of the police intrusion); CLANCY, supra note 66, at 64–66 (identifying 
governmental regulations, technological advances, and empirical observations as examples 
of considerations utilized by the Supreme Court in its reasonable expectation of privacy 
analysis); Kerr, supra note 96, at 507 (“Most Supreme Court opinions feature multiple 
models [and considerations] to varying degrees, and they often switch from model to model 
without recognizing the change.”). 
 110. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that whether the 
information has been exposed to the public significantly affects the expectation of privacy 
analysis); CLANCY, supra note 66, at 83–84 (discussing the public exposure consideration). 
 111. CLANCY, supra note 66, at 84–85; see also Kerr, supra note 96, at 508–09 (noting 
that when the likelihood is high that another will be able to pry into an individual’s affairs, 
courts will not likely find a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 112. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
 113. See id. at 173; CLANCY, supra note 35, at 123–25 (discussing the “open fields 
doctrine”).  The phrase “open fields” refers more generally to undeveloped or unutilized land 
outside of the curtilage. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11. 
 114. MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 233–38 (collecting aerial view cases, and arguing that 
this consideration has a limiting effect on Fourth Amendment protections). 
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not provide protection unless an individual takes measures to guard her land 
from aerial surveillance.115
The Supreme Court has also held that when members of the public can 
likely access information, an individual could not claim Fourth Amendment 
protections.
 
116  For instance, when an individual leaves garbage at the curb 
for pickup, she has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items 
searched for and seized by the police from the trash.117  The public 
exposure consideration remains a strong force in determining reasonable 
expectations of privacy.118
b.  Nature of the Police Intrusion:  How Are the Police Obtaining the 
Information? 
 
The Supreme Court has asserted that in Fourth Amendment analysis, 
“means [of search] do matter.”119  The consideration of the nature of the 
police intrusion serves as a “critical element” in determining objective 
reasonableness, especially in the case of enhanced law enforcement 
surveillance.120  Generally, where the Court finds that the government 
activity was only a “trivial intrusion,” the activity does not breach a 
reasonable expectation of privacy121 or qualify as a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.122
 
 115. Id.; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 108, at 54–56 (discussing the development of the 
“naked eye exception”). 
 
 116. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–83 (1983) (noting that since the 
movements could be readily observed there was no search).  There has been debate over the 
appropriateness of allowing third party observers, both actual and hypothetical, to preclude 
Fourth Amendment protection. See John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment:  
The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1128–30 (1989) (arguing 
that the allowance of hypothetical observers undermines the Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
 117. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that since the garbage 
was “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public,” the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy). 
 118. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 
617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); 
see also discussion infra Parts II.B.1.a, II.B.3.a. 
 119. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the fact that 
alternative means could be employed does not legitimize violative means (citing Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001))), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).  Not all commentators agree on the relevance of this 
consideration. See CLANCY, supra note 66, at 319–21 (arguing that this considerations 
undermines the Fourth Amendment because it allows police to get otherwise unobtainable 
information, regardless of the minimal nature of the intrusion); MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 
243 (arguing this consideration completely disregards the extent to which a person has tried 
to create an expectation of privacy, thereby undermining Katz). 
 120. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 430 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
122–23 (1979)). 
 121. See Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1197–98 (identifying dog sniffs, narcotics tests and 
not detailed aerial photographs as minimally intrusive governmental activities not requiring 
warrants). 
 122. Id. 
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The Court considered the “physically nonintrusive manner” of flyover 
surveillance of privately owned lands in determining that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy existed.123  It has also held that “expecting some sort 
of privacy invasion does not mean expecting all [privacy invasions].”124  
The Court differentiates between the more intrusive tactile search and the 
less intrusive visual search of the same item. The increased level of 
intrusion breaches the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.125  
The nature of the intrusion remains a viable consideration in determining 
reasonable expectations of privacy.126
c.  The Kind of Information Obtained:  What Do Police Now Know? 
 
The Court can also consider the kind of information that the police have 
collected in addition to how officers went about collecting it.127  This factor 
contemplates whether the information obtained is personal, private, or in 
need of particular protection.128
The Court uses this consideration when deciding whether the use of a 
new technological device violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.
 
129  
The Court classifies the device as “sense augmenting” or “extrasensory” by 
looking at the kind of information the device obtains.130  Classification 
based on the kind of information is typically dispositive in cases addressing 
new technology, making this consideration significant in determining 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.131
Devices that provide the same kind of information as an officer could 
obtain via his five senses without technological assistance are “sense 
 
 
 123. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (illustrating that the Court often 
uses multiple considerations by discussing the kind of information consideration, as well as 
the public exposure of flyover surveillance). 
 124. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:  
Technology, Privacy and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 147 (2002). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding cavity 
searches more intrusive than visual strip searches, and so a reasonable expectation of privacy 
existed only in the former); United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 601–03 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding the video surveillance violated the reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals 
videotaped in another’s hotel room due to the intrusive nature of videotaping). 
 127. See Kerr, supra note 96, at 512–13 (identifying this analysis as the “private facts” 
model which focuses on the actual information collected instead of the method of 
collection). 
 128. Id. at 506; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) 
(“[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is [illicit], and no other 
arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.”); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that the actual words spoken by an individual should not 
be “broadcast to the world” as this was too intrusive). 
 129. Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1199 (discussing how the Supreme Court favors this kind 
of information analysis); Koppel, supra note 54, at 1070–71 (examining the classification of 
various technology by the Court in this manner). 
 130. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 432. 
 131. Id. (arguing that the Court’s emphasis on kinds of information has linked Fourth 
Amendment protection to the classification of devices as “sense augmenting” or sense 
enhancing). 
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augmenting.”132  The Court does not require a warrant for information that 
could be obtained without a special device because the individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that kind of information.133  On the 
contrary, the Court has suggested that extrasensory technology, which 
“reveals information otherwise indiscernible to the unaided human senses,” 
requires a different analysis.134  The Court applied this reasoning in Kyllo v. 
United States—where police searched a house by using a thermal imaging 
gun to determine excessive heat sources within the home—because this 
information could not be obtained without the device.135  The kind of 
information obtained by an extrasensory device requires a warrant.136
d.  Quantity of Information Obtained:  How Much Information Does the 
Police Method Convey? 
 
While the kind of information obtained by the governmental activity 
undoubtedly speaks to the reasonable expectations of the people involved, 
the Court is also concerned about the sheer quantity of information that the 
police activity will obtain.137  The Supreme Court has indicated that where 
information “is noteworthy for its potential volume or detail, constitutional 
protections may be required.”138  However, the Court allows warrantless 
search activity where it finds “tightly circumscribed” information.139  In a 
simple example, the Court considers the quantity of information in “binary 
searches”—where the police only look for the presence of contraband.140  
Since the testing conveys only the illicit nature of the contraband, it does 
not qualify as a search.141
The Supreme Court indicated that the volume of information could 
intrude on personal privacy in U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters 




 132. Id. at 432–33. 
  The Court held that public 
disclosure of criminal “rap sheet[s]”—aggregates of an individual’s 
criminal activity—creates an intrusion on personal privacy despite the fact 
 133. Even significantly increased efficiency achieved by using “sense augmenting” 
devices does not warrant additional protection. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 
284 (1983) (holding the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement from 
improving their senses with technology). 
 134. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 433; see also HUBBART, supra note 61, at 156 (discussing 
“sense-enhancing” technological devices). 
 135. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
 136. Id. at 40. 
 137. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84 (recognizing that twenty-four hour surveillance 
involves a significant quantity of information as compared to that gathered by a beeper).   
 138. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 440. 
 139. Id. at 438 (discussing the relevance of the quantity of information in extrasensory 
technological devices). 
 140. Id. at 441–42 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). 
 141. Id.  Binary searches provide a good example of how these reasonable expectation 
considerations interact:  The court often highlights the limited type of information in 
addition to the low quantity of information provided. See supra note 128. 
 142. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
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the public record includes each individual event.143  The ruling indicates 
that though “[p]ublic disclosure of public facts is not an invasion of 
privacy,” a compilation of public facts could be.144
Reporters arose not under the Fourth Amendment, but under the Freedom 
of Information Act.
 
145  Commentators disagree as to whether the analysis 
can be applied to Fourth Amendment searches.146  However, in at least one 
federal circuit and a number of state courts, the aggregate amount of 
information obtained by police surveillance implicated a violation of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy of information.147  The viability of 
Reporters in the context of Fourth Amendment searches remains to be seen, 
but the quantity of information remains a consideration in the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis.148
D.  The Fourth Amendment and Tracking Devices:  Past Analyses 
 
The American legal system operates under a system of stare decisis, 
which requires courts to respect past precedent in order for the law to 
develop predictably and consistently.149  Thus, in attempting to understand 
how the Supreme Court might rule on a particular investigative technique in 
the future, one must look at not only the generic Fourth Amendment 
analysis, but also the holdings of cases with the most similar technologies.  
This section discusses the only Supreme Court rulings regarding tracking 
devices and the Fourth Amendment:  United States v. Knotts150 and United 
States v. Karo.151
 
 143. Id. at 764 (recognizing the different privacy implications between “scattered 
disclosure” of information that has to be located and compiled and “a single clearinghouse of 
information”). 
  This discussion includes the Court’s rulings on the 
constitutionality of both the installation and the monitoring of the tracking 
devices. 
 144. Richard C. Balough, Global Positioning System and the Internet:  A Combination 
with Privacy Risks, CBA REC., Oct. 2001, at 28, 31 (citing Reporters, 489 U.S. 749). 
 145. Reporters, 489 U.S. at 751 (arising under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (1982)). 
 146. Compare Blitz, supra note 34, at 1409–11 (discussing how video surveillance 
undermines privacy when police view the information it collects “in the aggregate” 
especially with ongoing recordings being maintained), with Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit 
Introduces the “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth 
Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-
holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/ (arguing Reporters does not apply in 
privacy cases).  Commentators have also argued that the aggregation of information should 
be a search because it undermines the practical obscurity provided when each piece of 
information has to be individually identified and compiled. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2(j) n.77 (5th ed. 2009) (citing Reporters, 489 U.S. at 749). 
 147. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir.) (collecting cases 
and examining the differences in information obtained between prolonged and short-term 
surveillance), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010). 
 148. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 
 150. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 151. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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1.  Examining the Installation of the Tracking Device 
In Knotts, police placed a beeper within a drum of chloroform with 
consent of the owner prior to its transfer to the defendant.152  Law 
enforcement officials monitored the beeper for approximately three days 
and tracked it to a private, rural residence.153  The defendant in Knotts 
never challenged the installation of the device because of a perceived lack 
of standing.154
In Karo, agents installed a beeper in a can of ether and monitored the 
movement of the can between private residences and commercial storage 
facilities intermittently over a period of four months.
 
155  Again, the Court 
found no constitutional issue with the installation of the tracking device 
since the DEA owned the can of ether at the time of attachment.156
The defendants’ lack of property interest in the item tracked forced the 
Court in both cases to ignore the constitutionality of installing the tracking 
device on the defendant’s personal property.
 
157  In neither instance did the 
Court address whether the placement of a tracking device on private 
property constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.158  These 
precedents leave the installation question unanswered.159
2.  Examining the Monitoring of the Device 
 
Both Knotts and Karo addressed whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists in information obtained by monitoring the tracking device.  
Ultimately, Knotts found that the police’s warrantless monitoring did not 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information the beeper 
provided.160  Karo agreed, but stated that the monitoring of a tracking 
device within the home did require a warrant.161
The Court utilized a number of the considerations discussed in Part I.C.3 
to find that no Fourth Amendment search existed.  These two cases provide 
an interesting illustration of how courts can use the same considerations to 
 
 
 152. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278, 286. 
 153. Id. at 278–79. 
 154. Id. at 279 n.*.  The concurrence in Knotts did note that it would be a more difficult 
case had the installation occurred on the personal property of the defendant. Id. at 286 
(Brennan, J., concurring). See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 155. Maclin, supra note 91, at 118. 
 156. Karo, 468 U.S. at 711 (“[B]y no stretch of the imagination could it be said that 
respondents then had any legitimate expectation of privacy in [the DEA’s can of ether].”).  
In addition, the Court found a sufficient exception to the warrant requirement due to the 
informant’s consent to switch the can with the tracking device for an untainted can. Id. 
 157. Id. at 712–13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279 n.*. 
 158. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712–13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279 n.*. 
 159. Lower courts face both issues. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 770 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 4, at i (including a question presented regarding installation). 
 160. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 161. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715–16.  Neither decision was unanimous. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
277 (5–4 decision); Maclin, supra note 91, at 119 (noting that seven Justices in Karo agreed 
that the home was off limits for the use of beeper technology, but the Court split on the more 
difficult question of whether or not monitoring of other facilities constituted a search). 
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either expand or limit Fourth Amendment protections.  In both instances, 
the Court focused on the public exposure and kind of information 
considerations. 
a.  Public Exposure Consideration 
In Knotts, the Court found that the beeper monitoring amounted only to 
following an individual in a car on public streets.162  The Court identified 
that a motor vehicle has a lessened expectation of privacy because “‘[i]t 
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in 
plain view.’”163  No reasonable expectation of privacy existed where the 
individual’s movements were in the public view and accessible by any 
individual.164
However, the Court has used the same consideration to provide 
protection.  The Karo Court distinguished its holding because the Knotts 
information was “voluntarily conveyed”
 
165 while the information obtained 
in Karo “could not have been visually verified” as it occurred within the 
home.166
b.  Nature of Police Intrusion Consideration 
  In other words, the movements had not been exposed to the 
public and thus retained their reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The Knotts Court classified the tracking beeper as a minimal intrusion.167  
The beeper’s intrusion equated to standard visual surveillance and therefore 
no reasonable expectation of privacy existed.168  By contrast, the Karo 
Court found that police obtaining information about the inside of the home 
qualified as a much higher intrusion.169  The Court found that the police’s 
use of a less intrusive search method did not justify monitoring within the 
home.170  The beeper violated the reasonable expectation of privacy that 
exists within the home and thus the Court saw it as a much more significant 
intrusion.171
c.  Kind of Information Consideration 
 
The Supreme Court, in both Knotts and Karo, took into consideration the 
kind of information the beeper obtained in determining whether or not a 
 
 162. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 163. Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 281–82 (“When [defendant] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads 
in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final 
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.”). 
 166. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
 167. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (noting the police’s limited use of the device). 
 168. Id. at 283–85. 
 169. Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 (rejecting the argument that a beeper was a “minuscule 
intrusion”). 
 170. MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 240 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 715). 
 171. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy existed.172  The Knotts Court found that 
the defendant had no expectation of privacy to be violated in the first place 
because the beeper merely enhanced the visual abilities that law 
enforcement officials already possessed.173  The Court emphasized the 
minimal sophistication of the device and the fact that the beeper did not 
“reveal information . . . that would not have been visible to the naked eye 
from outside the cabin.”174  The Court classified the beeper as a sense 
augmenting device, the use of which did not require a warrant.175
The Karo Court also emphasized the kind of information the search 
technique obtained, though it classified the beeper differently.  The Court 
held that when the kind of information acquired cannot be obtained through 
normal visual surveillance—here because of the sanctity of the home—the 
monitoring required a warrant.
 
176
d.  Quantity of Information Consideration 
 
Neither Karo nor Knotts discussed the quantity of information as a 
consideration in the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.  This 
oversight could be because the beeper technology utilized in the cases 
provided only a limited amount of location information.177
However, the Knotts Court left open future discussion regarding 
increased quantities of information by suggesting that its holding would not 
allow for unrestricted twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen.
 
178  The 
Court stated that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices . . . occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”179
II.  DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE COURTS REGARDING THE INSTALLATION 
AND MONITORING OF GPS DEVICES 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test explored in Part I.C is 
indefinite.  Courts struggle to reconcile the test with the constant advances 
 
 172. Id.; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 173. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
 174. Id. 
 175. MCINNIS, supra note 61, at 239 (“In effect, [the Court found that] the beeper simply 
enhanced the ability of the police to perform visual surveillance.”); Hutchins, supra note 25, 
at 435. 
 176. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15 (finding that the less intrusive nature of the search did not 
change the fact that the government obtained information they could not have otherwise 
obtained without a warrant). 
 177. Id. at 708 (explaining that the beeper technology was not accurate enough to 
determine in which storage locker the drum was located); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (noting 
that the beeper provided limited information and that the signals were lost periodically). 
 178. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283. 
 179. Id. at 284.  Some argue that this time has now arrived. See Blitz, supra note 34, at 
1386 (stating that the future the Court identified in Knotts may be upon society). 
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of surveillance technology.180  The type of surveillance and information 
obtained can vary greatly between past technology and the new, improved 
devices—making the considerations even more difficult to apply.  In 
addressing GPS technology, some courts try to apply the precedent of the 
more primitive technology in Knotts and Karo.181  Others seek to find a 
different way to measure objective expectations of privacy in the face of 
new technology.182
Part II.A examines how different courts currently evaluate whether the 
physical installation of a GPS device constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search.  Part II.B analyzes the split regarding GPS monitoring.  It discusses 
the reasonable expectation of privacy considerations utilized by different 
courts in determining the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS tracking.  
Part II.C addresses the current legislative responses to GPS surveillance. 
  In recent years, the use of GPS has caused a divide in 
the courts.  Although the courts tend to focus on whether the monitoring of 
information violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, the installation 
question presents important Fourth Amendment implications as well. 
A.  How Did That Get There?  Installation of GPS Units on Private 
Property 
This section looks at the different ways of approaching the 
constitutionality of the installation of a GPS unit.  The courts have not 
clearly split on this issue because most courts do not explicitly address this 
question.  However, varied approaches exist and there are no definitive 
answers.183  The lack of clear Supreme Court precedent also complicates 
the issue.184
Courts analyze the installation of a tracking device by determining 
whether the information obtained by the installation of a GPS violates a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
 
185  Courts typically focus on whether the 
individual has a property interest in the property to be tracked or the land on 
which the property is located.186
This section discusses two approaches to the installation question.  First, 





 180. See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 184 
n.58 (2010) (discussing the Court’s recent struggles with applying precedent to new 
technology).  
  These courts have focused on the lack of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location of the car during installation.  Other 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (9th Cir.), reh’g 
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-
7515); see also supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the considerations applied in Knotts and Karo). 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559–61 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g denied, 
625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 
1195, 1199–1200 (N.Y. 2009). 
 183. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). 
 184. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 185. See infra Part II.A. 
 186. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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courts indicate that tracking devices may require a warrant or probable 
cause where the individual’s property interest in the car itself is violated.188
1.  Extension of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Considerations:  
Installation Is Not a Search Based on the Location of the Vehicle 
 
Some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
focus the installation analysis on the location of the car when the device 
was installed.  For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that when the police 
find a car in an open field, public street, or parking lot, officers could install 
GPS units without a warrant.189  These circuits hold that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy or search activity exists where the cars are 
voluntarily and publicly exposed.190
These courts look mostly at the public exposure consideration in 
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed at the time 
of installation.
 
191  In United States v. McIver,192 law enforcement officers 
attached both GPS and electronic beeper devices to Christopher McIver’s 
vehicle in his driveway.193  The parties conceded that the curtilage of the 
home did not include this driveway.194  Since the police had not entered a 
private or hidden area, the court did not consider the installation of the GPS 
device to be a search.195  The court found the defendant’s asserted objective 
expectation of privacy to be insufficient.196  McIver went on to suggest that 
an issue might arise if the police “commit[] a trespass.”197
In United States v. Marquez,
 
198 DEA agents installed a GPS device on a 
vehicle and revisited the device seven times to replace batteries.199
 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding 
that officers had sufficient probable cause to attach tracking device and thus the attachment 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112–13 (1st 
Cir. 1977) (holding warrantless attachment of tracking device “only if the officers have 
probable cause at the time”). 
  The 
 189. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 
617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); 
see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); McIver, 186 
F.3d at 1126–27. 
 191. See supra Part I.C.3.a (discussing the public exposure consideration); see also 
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215; McIver, 186 F.3d at 1126–27. 
 192. 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 193. Id. at 1123.  The GPS unit actually malfunctioned after three days and all monitoring 
of location was completed via the beeper technology. Id. 
 194. Id.  McIver also addressed the idea that placing the unit on the car itself was a 
search, but still focused on public exposure. Id. at 1126.  The undercarriage of the car was 
publicly exposed and thus no reasonable expectation of privacy existed. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1127; see also United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 WL 
4595522, at *11 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) (finding that installation occurring on a public 
street did not require a warrant). 
 196. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 197. McIver, 186 F.3d at 1126. 
 198. 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 199. Id. at 607.  The court held that the appellant did not have standing to bring the 
suppression motion, but nonetheless spoke about the Fourth Amendment implications of the 
GPS device. Id. at 609–10. 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also suggested that police do 
not need a warrant when installation occurs in a “public place”.200  The 
court in United States v. Pineda-Moreno201 also focused on the location of 
the car during the installation.202  Agents installed devices on seven 
separate occasions:  four on public streets, one in a public parking lot, and 
twice in the driveway a few feet from Pineda-Moreno’s trailer.203  The 
Ninth Circuit found that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, even in the driveway.204  The government conceded that the car 
“was parked within the curtilage of his home when the agents attached the 
tracking device,” but this concession was not enough.205  Pineda-Moreno 
found that the defendant had not protected the car from passersby and so 
police could access it as well.206
Each of these circuits focused only on the location of the car during 
installation.  Since any individual could have attached something to the car, 
the police did not require a warrant to do so.  These courts do not consider 
the ownership of the vehicle in the analysis at all. 
 
2.  Looking Beyond Location:  Property Interests Suggest that Installation 
Should Require a Warrant 
None of the circuit courts has explicitly stated that an installation requires 
a warrant, but some older cases suggest another way to consider the 
 
 200. Id. at 610.  The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky recently 
agreed that a placement on a public street was not invalid, but that “[a]n entirely different 
conclusion might have resulted if . . . the officers had unlawfully trespassed onto private 
property to attach the devices.” United States v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668 (W.D. 
Ky. 2009). 
 201. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-
7515). 
 202. Id. at 1215. 
 203. Id. at 1213. 
 204. Id. at 1215.  Not all the circuit judges agreed with this reasoning in considering the 
petition for a rehearing en banc. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121–
26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that the denial for rehearing en banc 
was inappropriate). 
 205. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215. 
 206. Id. (finding that the defendant had not put up “special features” like a wall or signs 
to reasonably preserve his privacy).  This disregard for the curtilage has been challenged on 
appeal. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 21–24.  Professor Kerr has also 
questioned its validity. Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari Filed in Pineda-Moreno, The Ninth 
Circuit GPS Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petition-for-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-
gps-case/ (“The government’s concession [that the driveway was a part of the curtilage] 
should have lost the case for them, and the Ninth Circuit was wrong to bend over backwards 
to undo the concession.”).  However, Professor Kerr also notes that courts do not typically 
consider the driveway within the curtilage, which may have affected this court’s decision. Id. 
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constitutionality of the installation of a GPS device.207  These cases look at 
the property interest that an individual has in her vehicle.208
Justice William Brennan, in his Knotts concurrence, suggested that 
installation might be an issue where a defendant has a property interest in 
the property outfitted with a tracking device.
 
209  Justice Brennan cited 
Silverman v. United States210 for the proposition that when the government 
engages in physical intrusion of a protected area or property to obtain 
information, such an intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment.211  In 
Silverman, the Court held that an eavesdropping device planted on a heating 
duct in an apartment building was “an unauthorized physical penetration 
into the premises occupied by the petitioners,” which violated Fourth 
Amendment protections.212  The Court found that when police planted 
devices in a way that physically encroached upon a constitutionally 
protected area, the physical invasion constituted an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment.213 Likewise, the concurrence in Knotts 
suggested that the usurpation of a car by attaching a tracking device to 
private property constitutes a similar violation.214
The court in United States v. Shovea
 
215 stated that the installation of a 
tracking device on a motor vehicle “[a]t a minimum . . . is an actual 
trespass” without a warrant.216  The court found that despite the minimal 
nature of the intrusion, it raised Fourth Amendment concerns.217  However, 
the court did not reach the question of whether the installation of the device 
qualified as a search because it found probable cause for the installation.218  
At least one court has required reasonable suspicion for installation 
instead.219
 
 207. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961); United States v. 
Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 
(1st Cir. 1977). These cases precede Knotts and Karo, but failed to explicitly address the 
issue of installation. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 
 208. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 209. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 210. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 211. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J. concurring) (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509–
12). 
 212. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 509.  The Court later noted that, “the officers overheard the 
petitioners’ conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners’ house or office . . . a 
usurpation that was effected without their knowledge and without their consent.” Id. at 511. 
 213. Id. at 512 (calling the placement of the microphone an “actual intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area”).  The Fourth Amendment still protects such property 
interests post-Katz. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 214. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 215. 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978). 
 216. Id. at 1387. 
 217. Id.  Other courts have suggested that the minimal invasiveness of the attachment of 
the device did not warrant special protection. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 
2d 1303, 1307–08 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing Knotts, but not addressing Silverman). 
 218. Shovea, 580 F.2d at 1387.  The court in United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112–
13 (1st Cir. 1977), also suggested that an installation could be a search, but failed to reach 
the question since it found probable cause for the installation. 
 219. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir. May 1981).  Reasonable 
suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the term as “[a] particularized and objective basis, supported 
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More recently, it has again been suggested that the Silverman logic could 
be applied to tracking devices.220  The Court provides Fourth Amendment 
protections to a personal vehicle.221  Where the police physically interact 
with a defendant’s personal property in a way that can be characterized as 
“unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected 
area,” “usurping part of the petitioners’ house or office,” or “actual 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” then the individual’s 
property interest has been breached and the Fourth Amendment has been 
violated.222  Essentially, the physical contact with personal property could 
qualify as a violation of the Fourth Amendment when used to obtain 
information about the individual not otherwise obtainable.223
B.  Watching Every Move You Make:  The Federal Circuit Split Regarding 
the Monitoring of GPS Units 
 
No consensus exists on the installation question and the courts also 
disagree on whether monitoring GPS devices constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The split essentially arises between courts that focus 
on the similarities between beeper devices and GPS units, and the courts 
that focus on the differences.224
This section first discusses the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as well as the Ninth 
Circuit.  These circuits find that law enforcement officials do not need a 
warrant to monitor a GPS tracking device.  Part II.B.2 explains the Eighth 
Circuit’s dicta that monitoring does not qualify as a search unless the 
activity meets particular qualifications.  These courts all equate the GPS 
technology in question to Knotts beeper technology. 
 
 
by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity”), with supra 
note 69 and accompanying text.  
 220. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 770–71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 221. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 663 (1979) (“[P]eople are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step 
from their homes onto the public sidewalks.  Nor are they shorn of those interests when they 
step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
146 (1972))). 
 222. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–12 (1961); see also Jones, 625 F.3d 
at 770–71 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc).  
 223. Some argue that the installation of the GPS device constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
seizure when it interferes with the possessory interests of the individual’s vehicle. See United 
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009) (finding a seizure under the 
Massachusetts Constitution where installation required opening the car and utilizing its 
electrical system). 
 224. Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir.) (highlighting the 
differences between the technologies), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 671 (2010), with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.) 
(applying the Knotts beeper device analysis to GPS units), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th 
Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515). 
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This Note then discusses the recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia case, United States v. Maynard,225
1.  No Search:  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits Strictly Apply Knotts 
 which found that such 
monitoring qualifies a search under the Fourth Amendment.  The Maynard 
court identified and highlighted the differences between new and old 
technology in finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of 
GPS monitoring. 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that GPS surveillance of the 
movements of motor vehicles does not qualify as a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.226  Each of the analyses turned on the question of whether a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” existed and utilized the various 
considerations set out by the Supreme Court.227  These circuits relied 
predominantly on the public exposure and information type considerations 
in determining that an individual in a car with an attached GPS device does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on the open road.228
a.  Public Exposure Consideration 
 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied the public exposure analysis 
from Knotts to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements 
of the vehicles.229  The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Garcia,230 
specified that the car had only been monitored on public thoroughfares, and 
not private areas where a reasonable expectation of privacy might exist.231  
Based on the same logic, the defendant in Pineda-Moreno conceded that 
monitoring was not a search.232  Both courts applied the public exposure 
analysis of the Knotts-era beeper technology decisions to the GPS cases 
before them.233
 
 225. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 671 (2010). 
 
 226. Id. at 557; United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 227. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 228. The analyses are very similar in their focus to that of Karo and Knotts. See supra 
Part I.D.2. 
 229. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996; see supra notes 162–64 
and accompanying text. 
 230. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 231. Id. at 996; see also Recent Case, supra note 35, at 2231–32 (“[The decision] relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s consistent indication that there could be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in activities that were publicly observable.”). 
 232. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (discussing the defendant’s concession due to 
the car’s location on public thoroughfares and subsequent public exposure).  A recent district 
court to speak on the subject also relied on the public exposure consideration in its analysis. 
See United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 WL 4595522, at *8 (D. Mass. Nov. 
10, 2010) (holding that public roads do not provide drivers with any reasonable expectation 
of privacy). 
 233. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996. 
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b.  Nature of the Police Intrusion Consideration 
The circuit courts also considered the nature of the police activity.234  
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits found that GPS surveillance did not intrude 
more than previously approved types of physical tracking and thus did not 
warrant a higher level of privacy.235  In Garcia, the court found that the 
GPS tracking device functioned as a “substitute” for police tracking of “a 
car on a public street” that was “unequivocally not a search within the 
meaning of the amendment.”236  The courts found that minimal intrusion 
did not breach a reasonable expectation of privacy.237  Government activity 
classified as a minor intrusion does not breach a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.238  This analysis mirrors that of the Knotts Court.239
c.  Kind of Information Consideration 
 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits also analyzed the type of information in 
deciding whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.240  In fact, 
these circuits seem to mostly focus on this issue, mirroring the Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on this consideration in its evaluation of new technology 
in the past.241
Where the court sees the GPS as conveying the same kind of information 
as physical surveillance, no search exists.
 
242  The Seventh and Ninth Circuit 
courts saw no difference in the information gained by the police using an 
electronic beeper in Knotts and the current GPS technology.243  These 
courts simply saw GPS technology as a more efficient form of visual 
surveillance or tracking.244
For instance, in Garcia the court discussed the minimal differences and 
vast similarities it perceived between the use of GPS technology and other 
police surveillance techniques, which had already been found not to be a 
 
 
 234. See supra Part I.C.3.b. 
 235. See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (holding that the police could have 
obtained only the same information as by physically following the car).  District courts in 
other circuits have also followed this logic. See United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-
00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010) (holding that the use of GPS to 
overcome the impracticality of constant surveillance was immaterial). 
 236. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
 237. See id. at 998; see also Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216. 
 238. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra Part I.C.3.c (discussing this consideration). 
 241. See Recent Case, supra note 35, at 2233 (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s focus on 
what is and is not public information); see also Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1199 (noting the 
Court’s emphasis on the type of information obtained by new technology). 
 242. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 243. United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999).  This application of 
prior precedent to new, potentially more intrusive technologies has been criticized as 
ineffective. See Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1187–88 (arguing that intrusiveness of the type 
and quantity of information should be considered as opposed to reflexively applying 
precedent only dealing with less intrusive technology). 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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search.245  The Pineda-Moreno court held that the fact that the same 
information could be obtained via more traditional surveillance trumped the 
fact that the new technology worked differently.246  The newer technology 
provides the same kind of information as the old:  the location of the 
suspect.247  These courts simply saw GPS technology as a more efficient, 
and completely allowable, form of visual surveillance or tracking.248
d.  Quantity of Information Consideration 
 
The circuit courts that have found that GPS monitoring does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment have not explicitly addressed how the quantity of 
information obtained may affect an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
in United States v. Sparks,249 has recently addressed this argument.  Since 
the court found that GPS monitoring does not qualify as a search under the 
Fourth Amendment and Knotts, this analysis may be indicative of how 
other like-minded courts will address the quantity of information 
consideration.250  The Sparks court simply accepted the factual truth that 
the GPS provided a “wealth of information about [the defendant’s] personal 
preferences,” but found that it had little legal significance.251  The court 
held that the quantity of the information did not matter where the types of 
information remained the same.252  This focus on the type, rather than the 
quantity, of information reflects the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ current 
approach.253
2.  A Potential Middle Ground:  Eighth Circuit’s Qualified Dicta 
 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach mirrors that of the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, but differs slightly due to the unique procedural posture in United 
States v. Marquez.254
 
 245. See id. (“The only difference is that in the imaging case nothing touches the vehicle 
. . . .  But it is a distinction without any practical difference.”). 
  In Marquez, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
petitioner did not have standing to bring a claim regarding the installation 
 246. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (9th Cir.), reh’g 
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-
7515).  The Court distinguished Kyllo because it provided information about the home that 
was otherwise unobtainable without a warrant. Id. at 1216.  The fact that the GPS technology 
was new and not readily available to the public made no difference since the type of 
information obtained was the same. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
 249. No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 WL 4595522 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010). 
 250. Id. at *8. 
 251. Id. at *7–8. 
 252. Id. at *8 (“Although the continuous monitoring may capture quantitatively more 
information than brief stints of surveillance, the type of information collected is qualitatively 
the same.”); see also Jallad, supra note 46, at 367–68 (asserting that the GPS’s ability to 
collect large amounts of data does not indicate a larger intrusion than more primitive 
tracking devices when all the information is public information). 
 253. See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
 254. 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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or monitoring of a GPS.255  The court still opted to speak on whether 
monitoring of a GPS constituted a search.256
Much like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit looked at 
the public nature of the car on the road, finding that public exposure 
undermined the reasonable expectation of privacy.
 
257  In upholding the use 
of GPS, the court looked at the non-invasive nature of the police activity.258  
It also determined that the information gathered was the same as that 
obtained through typical physical surveillance.259
However, despite this similarity in analysis, the Eighth Circuit did not 
state its holding in the same manner as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.  The 
court set some limits to the constitutionality of monitoring a GPS unit: 
 
When electronic monitoring does not invade upon a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, no search has occurred. . . . Consequently, when 
police have reasonable suspicion that a particular vehicle is transporting 
drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked in a 
public place, they install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on it for a 
reasonable period of time.260
The court indicates a potential middle ground where law enforcement 
officials do not need a warrant for GPS monitoring, but must meet a 
minimal level of police accountability.
 
261
3.  GPS Monitoring Is a Fourth Amendment Search:  D.C. Circuit Says 
Knotts Does Not Apply 
 
In contrast to the other circuits, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
monitoring of a GPS unit for approximately one month was a Fourth 
Amendment search.262
 
 255. Id. at 609. 
  Maynard marks the first federal circuit court to 
 256. Id. at 609–10. 
 257. Id. at 609 (“A person traveling via automobile on public streets has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one locale to another.” (citing United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983))). 
 258. Id. at 610 (emphasizing the limited nature of the search). 
 259. Id. at 609–10 (distinguishing between information obtained by electronic 
surveillance in the home and in public as opposed to distinguishing between information 
obtained by physical and electronic surveillance). 
 260. Id.  
 261. Reasonable suspicion may have played a role in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits as 
well. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.3 (9th Cir.) (refusing to 
determine whether police had reasonable suspicion because there was no search), reh’g 
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-
7515); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that the district 
court found that there was reasonable suspicion for the GPS monitoring, but that the circuit 
court found this was not necessary). 
 262. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 n.* (D.C. Cir.) (noting that police had 
had a warrant to install the GPS, but it had expired), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).  A number of state courts have agreed with this finding. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 370–71 (Mass. 2009) (finding 
warrant issued to be valid); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201–03 (N.Y. 2009); State 
v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988) (regarding a radio transmitter); State v. 
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003).  Although many of the state courts decided based 
2011] FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GPS SURVEILLANCE 1727 
state that the monitoring of a GPS unit on an individual’s vehicle 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.263  The Maynard court used the 
same considerations as the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, but found 
that they applied differently to prolonged and extensive GPS 
surveillance.264
a.  Public Exposure Consideration 
 
The Maynard court did not apply the Knotts public exposure analysis 
without consideration of how the new technology affected the precedent.265  
In Maynard, the court found that, while Knotts stated that an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy on public thoroughfares, it did not 
stand for the premise that there was absolutely no expectation of privacy in 
his movements.266  Instead, the Maynard court looked at the probability 
that an average individual would have knowledge or access to the 
movements.267  In other words, it looked to see if the movements were truly 
“exposed.”268  The Supreme Court has utilized this probabilistic approach 
to public exposure in the past.269
The D.C. Circuit found that individuals did not publicly expose these 
movements over a prolonged time period “because the likelihood a stranger 
would observe all those movements is not just remote, it is essentially 
nil.”
 
270  Individuals do not intentionally expose every movement, route, and 
location over the course of a month in his vehicle and no other legitimate 
source of surveillance could provide such exposure.271  The court found not 
only that an individual would reasonably expect her movements to be 
private, but also that society would recognize this expectation as 
reasonable.272
b.  Nature of Police Intrusion Consideration 
 
The Maynard court also evaluated the nature of the police activity.  It 
classified the constant monitoring of the GPS tracker as an intrusive 
investigative technique despite the minimal physical intrusion.273
 
on their respective state constitutions as opposed to the U.S. Constitution, their analyses are 
indicative of the issues surrounding the GPS debate. 
  The court 
 263. Kerr, supra note 146. 
 264. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 265. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 266. Id. at 557. 
 267. Id. at 558–61 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); California 
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). 
 268. Id. at 558–62. 
 269. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 270. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. at 563 (recognizing an easier case where monitored activities occurred within 
the home, but asserting that privacy is not completely given up once an individual leaves the 
threshold of his home). 
 273. Id. at 560.  The court compared the difference between an undercover agent 
recording a conversation and a warrantless wiretap. Id. at 566.  Although the same 
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compared the month-long surveillance with the relatively minimal intrusion 
occurring in Knotts.274  It reasoned that this type of intrusion exceeds the 
intrusion allowable by police activity and violated the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.275  The court found that the level of intrusion of the 
police activity—the monitoring of an individual’s every movement over the 
course of a month—was much closer to the wholesale surveillance that 
Knotts warned against than to a limited, non-intrusive search.276
c.  Kind of Information Consideration 
 
Without using the terms “sense augmenting” or “extrasensory,”277 the 
D.C. Circuit determined that the information obtained by the prolonged 
surveillance of the GPS differed greatly from the limited beeper tracking in 
Knotts.278  The device had not simply augmented what the police could 
already do, but rather allowed for the atypical “visual surveillance so 
prolonged it reveals information not exposed to the public.”279
The Maynard court also noted the private nature of the information 
obtained, suggesting that it warranted particular protection.
 
280  Specifically, 
the court noted that prolonged surveillance provides different types of 
information to police than short-term surveillance.281  The kind of 
information, linked with the quantity of information discussed in the next 
section, indicated that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.282
d.  Quantity of Information Consideration 
 
The court also considered the sheer volume of information obtained by 
GPS surveillance.  It differentiated between prolonged and short-term 
surveillance, noting that the former gives much more information than the 
 
information is recorded, in the former method “reasonable expectation of control over 
personal information would not be defeated; in the latter it would be.” Id. 
 274. Id.; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (focusing on the 
sophisticated nature of the device and the fact that the device now makes it practicable to 
have constant surveillance, a fact not allowed by the “primitive” Knotts beeper). 
 275. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64; see also State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1045–46 
(Or. 1988) (analogizing the intrusive GPS surveillance on public streets to a situation where 
a police officer could take pictures of a living room from the street, but not enter the room). 
 276. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 n.*. 
 277. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 278. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–68. 
 279. Id. at 565; see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222, 231 (Wash. 2003) (requiring 
a warrant for GPS due in part to the enhancement of police abilities with this device both in 
surveillance and in volume). 
 280. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563–64; see also Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (taking into 
consideration the personal and private nature of the information obtained by GPS tracking). 
 281. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.  For a brief discussion of how this prolonged surveillance 
might also violate the First Amendment right to freedom of association, see Walsh & 
Dominguez, supra note 29, at 26. 
 282. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (“A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce 
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful 
husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or 
political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”). 
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latter.283  The Maynard court stated that Knotts inadequately addressed 
situations of prolonged surveillance with increased levels of information.284 
Knotts noted that twenty-four hour surveillance might trigger new 
constitutional issues in the future.285  The D.C. Circuit felt it was time to 
look at the question again.286
The Maynard court chose to look at the information obtained in its 
aggregate form.  Analogizing to Reporters, discussed in Part I.C.3.d, it 
found that the “whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than 
does the sum of its parts.”
 
287  Prior decisions had not considered the new 
ability of law enforcement officials to utilize comprehensive and continuous 
recording of the individual’s movements to develop a profile.288
The fact that the police obtained information about defendant’s 
“movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he moved among scores of 
places, thereby discovering the totality and pattern of his movements from 
place to place to place,” changed the analysis.
 
289  The court differentiated 
between the prolonged and recorded police surveillance tracking in 
Maynard and the limited and restricted tracking of Knotts.290  The amount 
of information and time was troublesome to the Maynard court and required 
a warrant.291
C.  Legislative Responses to the GPS Question 
 
Congress has not yet addressed GPS surveillance explicitly.292  Rule 41 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does provide guidelines for 
tracking device warrants.293  Specifically, a magistrate judge can issue a 
warrant to install a tracking device within the jurisdiction and to monitor 
within the district and outside of it.294  Rule 41 also requires that such a 
warrant specify the duration of its use, not to exceed forty-five days.295
 
 283. Id. at 562–63; see also Recent Case, supra note 35, at 2234–35 (asserting that courts 
should look at the intensity, duration, and level of detail of a search in determining 
reasonable expectations of privacy for new technologies). 
  
 284. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557. 
 285. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983). 
 286. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 
2009) (noting that the Knotts beeper was only a small step beyond following a vehicle, while 
a GPS allows for constant, overwhelming surveillance). 
 287. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558, 561. 
 288. Recent Case, supra note 35, at 2235. 
 289. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 290. Compare id. (monitored constantly for twenty-eight days), with Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
279 (monitored intermittently over three days). 
 291. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 292. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 412 n.3 (stating that Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 governs the use of electronic monitoring devices, but 
does not apply to electronic transmitting devices that trace locations (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510–2513, 2515–2522 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004))). 
 293. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 41(e)(2)(C).  
1730 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Installation must occur during the day, within ten days of the issuance of 
the warrant.296
Some states have opted to deal with both installation and monitoring GPS 
issues via legislation.  Seven state legislatures have addressed installation 
and use of GPS units.  Hawaii and Minnesota require court orders prior to 
installing or using a mobile tracking device unless the owner consents.
 
297  
South Carolina, Utah, Oklahoma, and Florida provide guidelines for mobile 
tracking device authorization, but do not specifically require warrants.298  
Pennsylvania also provides guidelines for authorization for mobile tracking 
devices, but explicitly limits monitoring to locations without a reasonable 
expectation of privacy unless there are exigent circumstances or a 
warrant.299
III.  RECOGNIZING A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN GPS 
SEARCHES 
 
Part II of this Note described the different approaches taken by courts in 
deciding whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
her vehicle and its movements when police utilize GPS surveillance.  Part 
II.A discussed the debate surrounding the installation of a GPS.  Part II.B 
described the circuit split among the federal courts regarding the monitoring 
of the GPS unit.  With an understanding of these analytical divides, Part III 
examines the conflict described in Part II. 
This Note asserts that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in both 
the installation and monitoring processes.  Part III.A argues that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in light of an individual’s property 
interest in her vehicle.  Part III.B asserts that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists due to the inapplicability of Knotts to GPS technology. 
Part III.C proposes a warrant requirement for GPS installation and 
monitoring and discusses the need for clear law enforcement rules.  This 
section also dispels a common concern that requiring a warrant would 
eliminate the effective use of GPS technology.  Finally, Part III.D suggests 
that a Congressional response may function best to protect privacy interests 
now and in the future. 
A.  GPS Installation Violates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
This part argues that courts should consider property interests in 
evaluating the installation of a GPS unit on private property.  Part III.A.1 
highlights how modern courts ignore property interests in the installation 
 
 296. Id. (allowing for exceptions to the daytime installation rule where police have good 
cause). 
 297. HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-42 (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.35, 626A.37, 
626A.38 (West 2009). 
 298. FLA. STAT. § 934.42 (2010) (no specification of appropriate timeline); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 177.6 (Supp. West 2011) (allowing monitoring for up to 60 days without 
extension); S.C. CODE ANN., § 17-30-140 (Supp. 2009) (no time limit); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-23a-15.5 (West 2008) (60 days). 
 299. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5761 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). 
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analysis.  Part III.A.2 examines how the installation of a GPS unit functions 
as a search in light of the reasonable expectation of privacy. 
1.  The Modern Installation Approach Incorrectly Ignores Property Interests 
No general consensus exists among the courts about whether the 
installation of a GPS constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.  The 
Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the installation question, but 
it has suggested that the usurpation of individual property for police 
purposes violates the Fourth Amendment.300
The lower courts’ current approaches focus only on the location of the 
vehicle when the police attach the GPS device
 
301—ignoring the 
individual’s property interest in her car.302  Courts should consider whether 
police enter private property, but the inquiry should not stop there.303
2.  Application of the Property Interest Consideration Reveals a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy and a Fourth Amendment Search 
  Some 
may find installation more palatable where it occurs on a public street, but 
this inquiry simply does not address the police’s physical usurpation of 
protected property. 
Courts have failed to recognize the similarities between the GPS units in 
modern cases and the electronic listening devices in Katz and Silverman.304  
Though GPS cannot be said to penetrate the car, it bears striking functional 
resemblance to the use of the eavesdropping device in Katz, which was 
found to be a Fourth Amendment search.305  There, the Court found that the 
attachment of the listening device violated the reasonable expectation of 
privacy within the telephone booth.306  The case can be clearly understood 
in terms of property interests.307
 
 300. See supra Part I.D.1, notes 209–14 and accompanying text. 
  Katz had obtained a temporary property 
interest in that telephone booth which the police violated by attaching the 
 301. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 302. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 303. This Note would be remiss if it did not comment on the Pineda-Moreno decision’s 
treatment of installation. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.  GPS surveillance 
should not be allowed to undercut the protection already granted to the curtilage.  The 
Supreme Court should at the very least maintain the curtilage protections it has already 
provided. See supra note 103. 
 304. See supra Part I.C.1, notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
 305. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities . . . 
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . .  
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate 
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”). 
 306. Id. at 358–59. 
 307. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text; see also Kerr, supra note 97, 822–23.  
For a discussion of how Katz continues to protect property interests, and how the case may 
never have shifted the Court’s focus from them, see supra notes 91, 96–97 and 
accompanying text. 
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device to commandeer it.308  His property right to exclude others was 
violated.309
In Silverman, the attachment of the monitoring device on the heating duct 
of the home transformed the home into a microphone for police 
surveillance.
 
310  The Court reasoned that the usurpation of the premises in 
order to get information law enforcement officials could not otherwise have 
obtained violated the Fourth Amendment.311  Other courts have extended 
this logic to tracking devices because the device also allows police to usurp 
private property indiscriminately.312
The Court should find similarly in the case of GPS units.  The GPS 
monitor transforms the car into a police tool.  It allows every movement of 
the car to be recorded and used against the individual.
 
313  The attachment of 
a GPS device to private property physically encroaches and intrudes on 
private property—much like the devices in Katz and Silverman.314  It 
usurps the individual’s vehicle.315
Some courts may want to focus on the lower expectation of privacy of 
the automobile than in the home.
 
316  However, more recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence protects both property interests and the expectation of privacy 
in the automobile.317  The warrantless attachment of a GPS unit on a 
vehicle violates a reasonable expectation of privacy and the Court should 
protect against it.318
B.  Monitoring Also Violates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
An individual also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
movements monitored by a GPS unit.  Part III.B.1 argues that the Knotts 
precedent does not apply because it does not address the increased 
intrusiveness of GPS surveillance.  Part III.B.2 focuses on one of the major 
differences between beeper and GPS technology—the quantity and kind of 
information obtained.  It asserts that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in light of the potential for law enforcement officials to obtain huge 
quantities of personal information.  Part III.B.3 examines how the other 
reasonable expectation of privacy considerations—public exposure and the 
 
 308. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text; see also Kerr, supra note 97, 822–23 
(“Like the hotel guest gaining Fourth Amendment rights in the hotel room during his stay, 
Katz acquired the owner’s privacy rights in the phone booth during the period of his phone 
call.”). 
 309. See Kerr, supra note 97, at 823. 
 310. 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961); see supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 215–19 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 314. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 315. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 316. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 318. See supra notes 104–07.  Issues may arise around borrowed cars or other 
insubstantial property interests, but the Court will deal with these standing issues under a 
different analysis. See supra notes 81–84. 
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nature of police intrusion—also indicate a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in light of the advanced capabilities of GPS technology. 
1.  Reflexively Applying Past Precedent Is Insufficient:  The Technology Is 
Too Different 
Applying Knotts without modifying its approach in consideration of the 
unique characteristics of new technology serves to greatly underestimate the 
intrusive capabilities of GPS surveillance.319  Even in 1983, the Court noted 
that it would have to treat more advanced technologies differently.320  Since 
then, almost every GPS monitoring case has expressed concern over the 
widespread use of newer and more advanced surveillance technology.321  
Despite these concerns, the analyses of the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits completely disregard the increased intrusiveness of GPS 
technology compared to the older beeper technology.322
This approach ignores the dissimilarities between the technologies.
 
323  
When the Court decided Knotts in 1983, tracking and observing an 
individual, even with a tracking device, required considerable effort.324  
Today police can, and do, readily obtain GPS units.325  Prior technology did 
not provide recordings of every movement, but GPS does.326  The beepers 
used in Knotts and Karo could provide only limited, and sometimes 
incomplete, location information.327  On the contrary, GPS units can 
accurately pinpoint location within meters, as well as identify elevation, 
speed and direction.328  In addition, law enforcement officials typically use 
GPS technology over longer periods of time than past technology due to its 
low cost, ease of use, and advanced capabilities.329
 
 319. See Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1187–88. 
 
 320. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (stating that when “such dragnet-
type law enforcement practices” occurred, the court would deal with them). 
 321. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (“It is 
imaginable that a police unit could undertake ‘wholesale surveillance’ . . . [which] would 
raise different concerns than the ones present here.”); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 
F.3d 1212, 1216 n.2 (9th Cir.) (agreeing that if mass surveillance were to occur, then the 
Fourth Amendment applications would need to be reevaluated), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120 
(9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Should government someday decide to institute 
programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide 
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a 
search.”). 
 322. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2 (discussing these circuits’ approaches). 
 323. Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1187. 
 324. Blitz, supra note 34, at 1374. 
 325. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
 329. Compare United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, 
at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010) (more than eleven months), and People v. Weaver, 909 
N.E.2d 1195, 1195 (N.Y. 2009) (sixty-five days), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 
279 (1983) (three days). 
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Allowing the Court’s evaluation of early surveillance technology to 
automatically determine how the Court deals with advanced surveillance 
technology fails to address these greater intrusions of new technology.330  
The tracking devices of 2011 are no longer the minimal intrusions of 
twenty-five years ago.  Limits on the warrantless use of GPS technology 
must reflect the realities of new technology in order to provide actual 
protection.331
2.  The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis Must Seriously 
Consider Both the Kind and Quantity of Information GPS Can Obtain 
 
One of the significant differences between the Knotts beeper technology 
and the GPS technology of Pineda-Moreno lies in the quantity and extent of 
the information able to be conveyed to law enforcement.332  The Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have failed to address this difference.333  By 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Maynard noted that the kind and quantity of 
information provided by the GPS unit undermines the individual’s 
subjective reasonable expectation of privacy, as well as societal 
expectations of privacy.334
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits classified GPS technology and 
the kind of information it obtained as “sense augmenting.”
 
335  The 
“equating [of] electronic surveillance with what police might theoretically 
accomplish with [the] naked eye” severely limits the Fourth Amendment 
and protects little.336  The GPS, though similar in function to other tracking 
devices, provides novel information.337  The GPS accomplishes what police 
cannot realistically accomplish independently—constant surveillance—
indicating more than just sense augmentation.338
The emphasis on the visual nature of information, as opposed to the vast 
amount of details that prolonged surveillance can provide, severely 
underestimates the capability of the GPS.  The Karo court recognized that 




 330. Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1187. 
  This 
realization needs to be extended to the modern GPS technology.  The GPS 
 331. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment must “keep pace with the march of science”). 
 332. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.3. 
 333. See supra Parts II.B.1.c, II.B.1.d, II.B.2. 
 334. See supra Parts II.B.3.c, II.B.3.d; see also Hutchins, supra note 93, at 1188 
(advocating intrusiveness of the technology as the “benchmark” for assessing a search). 
 335. See supra notes 132–34 (describing the sense augmenting analysis); notes 242–44 
(noting that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied this analysis). 
 336. Maclin, supra note 91, at 85.  A number of Supreme Court Justices agree. See 
CLANCY, supra note 66, at 313 n.149 (identifying numerous dissenting opinions in Fourth 
Amendment cases noting the need to provide protection in the face of advancing and 
intrusive technology). 
 337. See supra Part I.A.3; see also Clancy, supra note 88, at 30 (noting that technology 
has “dramatically increased the government’s ability to obtain information”). 
 338. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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provides private, and potentially extensive, information and it deserves 
protection. 
The aggregate form of this private information even more clearly 
conveys the need for protection.  When police can monitor every 
movement, a feat not possible with the Knotts technology, the police obtain 
the totality and pattern of an individual’s movements.340  No individual 
reasonably expects to divulge the compilation of movements, the inferences 
drawn, and the sheer volume of information potentially obtained by GPS.341
However, the concern about “quantity” involves not only the aggregate 
form, but also the constant and unrelenting nature of the surveillance.
 
342  A 
comparison of the new technology with the intermittency of past tracking 
devices amplifies this concern.343
The Maynard approach better protects against both quantity concerns.
  The potential alone for this kind of 
information to be uncovered requires protection. 
344  
Furthermore, recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum 
total of an individual’s affairs would better match societal expectations345—
the emphasized component of the Katz test.346  The Knotts Court put off the 
question of twenty-four hour surveillance, but the time has come for the 
Court to address the realities of GPS.347
3.  Other Considerations Also Point to a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
When Viewed In Light of the Advanced Capabilities of the GPS 
 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits generally failed to consider the 
difference between the current technology and the Knotts technology.348  
The circuits failed to do so in regards to the differences in the kind and 
quantity of information.349
a.  Public Exposure Consideration 
  This section asserts that other considerations 
also point to the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in light of 
the increased intrusiveness of the GPS technology. 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits emphasized the public exposure 
consideration.350  However, they failed to consider how the technology 
affects this analysis.  That an individual keeps a car in public does not 
automatically mean that she then voluntarily conveyed all her movements, 
especially over long periods of time.351
 
 340. See supra notes 287–91 and accompanying text. 
  No one expects her movements to 
 341. See supra notes 283–86. 
 342. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 345. Recent Case, supra note 35, at 2235. 
 346. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 349. See supra Parts II.B.1.c, II.B.1.d, II.B.2. 
 350. See supra Parts II.B.1.a, II.B.2. 
 351. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
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be recorded for that amount of time.352  In addition, a member of the public 
would not have access to this level of information, a factor in the 
consideration.353  Instead of simply noting the outdoor nature of a car, 
Maynard focused on the more difficult question of whether the individual’s 
movements were actually exposed.354  The lack of intentional exposure and 
public accessibility indicates a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
movements.355
b.  Nature of Police Intrusion Consideration 
 
None of the courts have focused on the nature of the police activity.356  
Even still, the increased level of intrusiveness of twenty-four hour tracking 
for months at a time undoubtedly indicates a more intrusive act than 
intermittent tracking for a few days.357
C.  A Warrant Should Be Required for Installation and Monitoring of GPS 
To Uphold the Protections of the Fourth Amendment 
  The fact that attachment of the unit 
to the car also intrudes on the individual’s property interest, as discussed in 
Part III.A, also indicates the increased level of intrusion. 
Since a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in both aspects of GPS 
surveillance, as examined in Parts III.A and III.B, the Fourth Amendment 
applies.358  This section advocates for a clear warrant requirement for GPS 
surveillance.  It emphasizes the need for clear, unambiguous rules.359  It 
also addresses concerns that a warrant requirement will undermine the 
effective use of GPS technology.360
1.  Law Enforcement Officials Need Clear Rules 
 
The Fourth Amendment must protect privacy, but must also provide 
appropriate guidelines to law enforcement agencies.361  In order to protect 
against unnecessary intrusions, the police need to know what violates 
Fourth Amendment rights prior to taking action.  Clear rules provide the 
necessary “ex ante guidance for police.”362
 
 352. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 
 353. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra Part III.B.3.a; see also Koppel, supra note 54, at 1084 (arguing that GPS 
surveillance goes beyond basic public exposure to a level not anticipated or otherwise 
tolerated). 
 355. The movements may technically be in public, but they were previously obscured by 
the fact that they had to be individually identified and compiled. See supra note 146; see also 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716. (1984) (noting a difference between information 
voluntarily conveyed and secretly obtained within the home). 
 356. See supra Parts II.B.1.b, II.B.2, II.B.3.b. 
 357. See supra note 290. 
 358. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 359. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
 360. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 361. See Kerr, supra note 96, at 544. 
 362. Id. 
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Maynard emphasizes the differences between prolonged surveillance and 
does not apply the Knotts analysis.363  Despite this improvement, Maynard 
fails to adequately provide a cogent holding to be applied consistently in 
future cases.364
The Maynard holding requires a warrant because it finds one month of 
GPS surveillance too intrusive, but does not provide clear guidance on what 
is “too intrusive” for future cases.
  Clear warrant requirements are necessary to avoid future 
violations of the Fourth Amendment. 
365  Under the language of the case, the 
Maynard court could potentially accept information from a GPS unit on a 
car for one to two days.366
However, the quantity analysis is not only concerned with the 
aggregate.
  The court relied on the aggregate of 
information, creating an unclear rule for police. 
367  The constant nature of GPS searches indicate a level of 
intrusiveness not yet dealt with by the Court in regards to tracking 
devices.368  The emphasis moving forward should be on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy violated by installing and monitoring a GPS 
device.369  The Fourth Amendment clearly requires a warrant in this type of 
situation.370
2.  A Warrant Requirement Will Protect Privacy and Only Minimally 
Affect the Efficacy of Law Enforcement Departments 
  The inadequacy of Maynard can be easily addressed with a 
definitive warrant requirement for GPS installation. 
This section asserts that a warrant requirement will protect individual 
privacy, but will not severely limit law enforcement officials’ effective use 
of GPS technology.  The Fourth Amendment serves as a barrier between 
police activity and individual liberty371—which the law needs to respect.  
The Constitution presumes a warrant requirement for searches, and the 
Court should not allow continual sidestepping of the requirement.372
Warrants will not likely hinder the successful use of GPS technology by 
law enforcement officials.  In many cases already before the courts, police 
had applied for and received GPS warrants.
  There 
is no need for additional exceptions. 
373
 
 363. See supra Part II.B.3. 
  The federal judiciary 
 364. See Kerr, supra note 146. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc); Kerr, supra note 146. 
 367. See supra notes 342–43. 
 368. See generally Hutchins, supra note 25 (discussing how intrusiveness based on type 
and quantity of information should be a major factor in determining the constitutionality of 
GPS searches). 
 369. See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
 370. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 371. Hutchins, supra note 25, at 444. 
 372. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 373. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 n.* (D.C. Cir.) (noting that police 
had had a warrant to install the GPS, but it had expired), reh’g denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 
1738 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
already has standards in place for this type of warrant.374
In addition, police often use GPS surveillance for a prolonged period in 
order for it to be useful.
  These facts 
indicate that the standard probable cause requirement could easily be 
employed in other cases. 
375  The additional time necessary to obtain a 
warrant will not likely detract from the usefulness of the process.  In cases 
where this is not true, the exigent circumstances exception already permits 
warrantless surveillance.376  The other categorical exceptions to the warrant 
requirement will also still apply to all GPS situations.377
A warrant requirement would only affect the ability of police to engage 
in GPS surveillance without probable cause.
  The Court does 
not need to create an additional exception. 
378  The Court should not 
condone this because allowing ongoing GPS surveillance with no probable 
cause undermines the intent of the Fourth Amendment to “end the abuse[s] 
of general exploratory searches.”379  Ultimately, the fact that police may 
need to apply for more warrants is not a legitimate reason to extend warrant 
exceptions.380
D.  Congress May Be More Willing and Better Equipped To Create 
Comprehensive Installation and Monitoring Rules 
 
Part III.C discusses the need for clear Fourth Amendment rules for law 
enforcement departments and advocates using the warrant requirement to 
reach this goal.  The Court could classify GPS surveillance as a search 
based on the reasonable expectations of privacy that are violated.381
This section argues that Congress may be better equipped to 
comprehensively protect reasonable expectations of privacy for two basic 
reasons.  First, as will be discussed in Part III.D.1, the Court has not been 
sensitive to past changes of technology and much of the concern about GPS 
lies in how different it is from precedent.  Second, Congress has the ability 
to look beyond the facts of a single case to consider various forms of 
technology and to react to technological advances in a way that will 
continue to protect Fourth Amendment interests.  Part III.D.2 will discuss 
  
However, this Note suggests that the most complete and comprehensive 
protection could be provided by Congress in light of the many types of GPS 
devices and the ever-advancing nature of the technology. 
 
370–71 (Mass. 2009) (finding warrant issued to be valid); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 
(Wash. 2003) (10-day warrant issued). 
 374. See supra notes 294–96 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 68. 
 377. See supra note 68. 
 378. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 379. HUBBART, supra note 61, at 75; see supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 380. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (“The argument that a warrant 
requirement would oblige the Government to obtain warrants in a large number of cases is 
hardly a compelling argument against the requirement.”). 
 381. See supra Parts III.A, III.B. 
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how Congress can create specific rules regarding the installation and 
monitoring of GPS devices. 
1.  The Court Has Not Been Sensitive to the Intrusiveness of New 
Technology 
The Court could certainly require a warrant to protect against 
unreasonable GPS searches under the analysis of Parts III.A and III.B.  
However, a few factors hinder the ability of the Court to do so effectively. 
The Court has shown itself to have difficulty dealing with new 
technologies.382  The wide classification of technology as “sense 
augmenting,” and the dispositive nature of that classification, indicate the 
Court’s reluctance to recognize the privacy intrusions created by new 
technology.383  The Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test can also 
be self-fulfilling.  As the Court allows these increased intrusions, it lowers 
the supposedly objective “expectation”, leading to a greater allowance of 
intrusive techniques under the Katz test.384  This downward spiral does not 
adequately reflect the protection that the Fourth Amendment intended.385
In addition, a number of functional difficulties arise.  The Court typically 
creates narrow rules limited to the facts of the case in front of them.
 
386  This 
prevents comprehensive protections.  Stare decisis also limits the Supreme 
Court and does not always allow for logical changes in light of 
technological advancement.387  Furthermore, delays inherent in the system 
have the practical effect that the Court does not address a technological 
issue until a newer technological device is already infringing rights.388
2.  Congress Can Respond Best to the GPS Problem 
  
These limitations, coupled with the Court’s reluctance, indicate that the 
judicial branch may not be the most effective or expedient in providing 
protections from GPS surveillance. 
This Note has discussed at length the issues surrounding the installation 
and monitoring of GPS.  In order for adequate protection, both aspects 
should be addressed.  Congress, not the courts, is able to create rules to 
address both the installation and monitoring concerns holistically.  
Furthermore, if the Court does not adequately respond to the devastating 
 
 382. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. But see, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (addressing electronic surveillance of public areas).  
 383. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 384. See Glancy, supra note 22, at 334 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 385. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the intent of the Fourth Amendment). 
 386. See Blitz, supra note 34, at 1420 (noting that Congress has more options than judges 
who must “resolve particular disputes with specified remedies”). 
 387. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 388. GPS technology has been used by civilians since 1996 and has not yet reached the 
Supreme Court. See supra notes 30–32.  Technology continues to outpace the ability or 
willingness of the Court to respond. 
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effects of GPS on individual privacy, the Congress will have to 
independently protect individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 
The law should require a warrant for installation of a GPS because it 
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.389  However, requiring a 
warrant to install a GPS device on private property does not address every 
Fourth Amendment issue.  Even after a device is attached, monitoring can 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.390  Whether or not the Supreme 
Court decides to require a warrant, restraints on monitoring must be 
developed.  In order to address the ambiguity issue of Maynard, discussed 
in Part III.C.1, definitive time limits for monitoring should be developed.  
Indefinite monitoring allows police to collect a huge amount of personal 
information.391  A time frame would provide additional protection and 
alleviate the concerns about ongoing, relentless surveillance.392
Congress has acted in similar situations before and could easily do so in 
regards to GPS technology.
  Congress 
is in a better position to develop such detailed limits. 
393  Congress can also better address GPS 
technology as a whole, while courtscan only address one type of device in 
one factual circumstance.  The legislature can obtain the relevant 
information about various types of tracking devices and use it to develop 
comprehensive rules.394
Requirements regarding GPS surveillance will likely have to be updated 
since this type of technology is always advancing.  For example, installation 
of a GPS in the current form may no longer be necessary, making even the 
Court’s warrant requirement of questionable effectiveness.
 
395  Congress can 
better react and experiment with specific rules in response to these ongoing 
changes in technology.396
CONCLUSION 
  Its legislation does not need to reflect past 
precedent and in many ways can better reflect actual “reasonable 
expectations of privacy.”  A legislative response would continue to protect 
individual privacy from Fourth Amendment violations in a way that the 
Court cannot. 
Law enforcement departments can certainly benefit from the use of GPS 
technology to track suspects.  However, this benefit cannot come at the cost 
of individual privacy.  A reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the 
 
 389. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
 390. See supra Part III.B. 
 391. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 392. See supra Part II.C (identifying legislative time frames). 
 393. See supra note 292; see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2513, 2515–2522 (2006); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006); Kerr, supra note 97, at 855–56 (describing both legislative 
reactions to Supreme Court decisions and legislative initiatives to protect privacy). 
 394. Kerr, supra note 97, at 807–08. 
 395. See Blitz, supra note 34, at 1386 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.3, 20.18 (2009) (noting that 
the FCC has also recently required all cell phone manufacturers to install tracking 
technology in their products to ensure that 911 responders can quickly find individuals). 
 396. Blitz, supra note 34, at 1420–21; Kerr, supra note 97, at 807–08. 
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information obtained by installing and monitoring a GPS unit.  This 
expectation must be protected by a warrant.  The courts have the 
opportunity to require a warrant on the basis of either the installation or 
monitoring of the device under the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  
Even so, Congress should protect the privacy of citizens from unreasonable 
search. 
 
